Road to Disaster: A New History of America's Descent into Vietnam
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- Author：Brian VanDeMark
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Summary
"The most thoughtful and judicious one-volume history of the war and the American political leaders who presided over the difficult and painful decisions that shaped this history。 The book will stand for the foreseeable future as the best study of the tragic mistakes that led to so much suffering。"—Robert Dallek
Many books have been written on the tragic decisions regarding Vietnam made by the young stars of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations。 Yet despite millions of words of analysis and reflection， no historian has been able to explain why such decent， brilliant， and previously successful men stumbled so badly。
That changes with Road to Disaster。 Historian Brian VanDeMark draws upon decades of archival research， his own interviews with many of those involved， and a wealth of previously unheard recordings by Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford， who served as Defense Secretaries for Kennedy and Johnson。 Yet beyond that， Road to Disaster is also the first history of the war to look at the cataclysmic decisions of those in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations through the prism of recent research in cognitive science， psychology， and organizational theory to explain why the "Best and the Brightest" became trapped in situations that suffocated creative thinking and willingness to dissent， why they found change so hard， and why they were so blind to their own errors。
An epic history of America’s march to quagmire， Road to Disaster is a landmark in scholarship and a book of immense importance。
Many books have been written on the tragic decisions regarding Vietnam made by the young stars of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations。 Yet despite millions of words of analysis and reflection， no historian has been able to explain why such decent， brilliant， and previously successful men stumbled so badly。
That changes with Road to Disaster。 Historian Brian VanDeMark draws upon decades of archival research， his own interviews with many of those involved， and a wealth of previously unheard recordings by Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford， who served as Defense Secretaries for Kennedy and Johnson。 Yet beyond that， Road to Disaster is also the first history of the war to look at the cataclysmic decisions of those in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations through the prism of recent research in cognitive science， psychology， and organizational theory to explain why the "Best and the Brightest" became trapped in situations that suffocated creative thinking and willingness to dissent， why they found change so hard， and why they were so blind to their own errors。
An epic history of America’s march to quagmire， Road to Disaster is a landmark in scholarship and a book of immense importance。
Reviews
Jonathan Hutchins
，
Slow start。 Prolog is all about the author and how cool he is for knowing McNamera and co。
Fred Campau
，
I say 4 and 1/2 stars for this well written and very interesting book。 So many mistakes were made by all the major players in the tragic story of the Vietnam War。I graduated from High School in 1967 and College in 1971。 My Marine stepbrother Phil was killed in Nam in 1966。 I brother Neil， another Marine， was in route to Nam in February 1967 when my Dad died。 This saved him from serving there。 I lucked out with a number of 299 in the first Draft lottery。 I read Ron Chernow’s “Washington: A Life” I say 4 and 1/2 stars for this well written and very interesting book。 So many mistakes were made by all the major players in the tragic story of the Vietnam War。I graduated from High School in 1967 and College in 1971。 My Marine stepbrother Phil was killed in Nam in 1966。 I brother Neil， another Marine， was in route to Nam in February 1967 when my Dad died。 This saved him from serving there。 I lucked out with a number of 299 in the first Draft lottery。 I read Ron Chernow’s “Washington: A Life” earlier this year。 The North’s People’s Army of Vietnam and the Viet Cong used the same strategy against the US that Washington used against the British in the Revolutionary war。 No major battles， small fights， ambush， hit and run， just survive to fight another day。 It worked。 。。。more
Robert Sparrenberger
，
It wasn’t that this was poorly written or contained errors but there wasn’t anything really new to it。 If you have read David Halberstam’s “The Best and the Brightest” back in 1972 then that should be enough on the main participants and decision makers during the Vietnam war。 The author tries to throw some science into the mix with how and why our leaders made terrible mistakes but that is only sprinkled in during the narrative which is a recounting of the events of the war and the people that m It wasn’t that this was poorly written or contained errors but there wasn’t anything really new to it。 If you have read David Halberstam’s “The Best and the Brightest” back in 1972 then that should be enough on the main participants and decision makers during the Vietnam war。 The author tries to throw some science into the mix with how and why our leaders made terrible mistakes but that is only sprinkled in during the narrative which is a recounting of the events of the war and the people that made them。 。。。more
Jerome
，
An elegant and well-written work。VanDeMark mainly explores the reasoning behind the policy decisions made during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations。 He looks at how policymakers like Kennedy， Johnson， McNamara， and Rusk often viewed the North Vietnamese as “irrational，” while making decisions that were often based on their own uncertainty and ignorance （most of the book seems to be from McNamara’s perspective， though） He also describes their confidence in their own ability to control events An elegant and well-written work。VanDeMark mainly explores the reasoning behind the policy decisions made during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations。 He looks at how policymakers like Kennedy， Johnson， McNamara， and Rusk often viewed the North Vietnamese as “irrational，” while making decisions that were often based on their own uncertainty and ignorance （most of the book seems to be from McNamara’s perspective， though） He also describes their confidence in their own ability to control events， which he attributes to the Cuban missile crisis。 VanDeMark also does a good job putting their Vietnam policies in a wider Cold War context， and how policymakers often reinforced each others’ views and tendencies。 VanDeMark also argues that Johnson decided to commit combat troops incrementally while believing it was still a mistake。VanDeMark looks at how many of these decisionmakers operated during the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis。 These events take up a pretty good chunk of the book early on， and some readers may find it excessive。 The book sometimes seems to psychoanalyze too much， and some points could have been elaborated on （like the debate over strategy） Some of his comments on psychology can be distracting， and there could have been more coverage of the Cold War foreign policy mantras and domestic politics that played a role， as well as the impact of previous presidents’ decisionmaking。 At times it seems like VanDeMark believes a caricature of the civilian policymakers being well-intentioned “tragic figures” while the military leadership was made up opinionated， ignorant and inflexible bureaucratic infighters。 At one point he writes that Nixon “sabotaged” LBJ’s peace initiatives during the election， but doesn’t really look at how viable those initiatives were in the first place。 There could also have been more coverage of the NLF; the way VanDeMark writes about them gives the impression that they were independent of the North Vietnamese。 VanDeMark also claims that “Vietnam destroyed many things， not least the Establishment’s dominance of American foreign policy。” He follows this assertion up with the story of the postwar lives of McGeorge Bundy and McNamara。 He doesn’t， however， try to explain that particular argument。Still， an insightful and well-researched work。 。。。more
Piker7977
，
Road to Disaster contains some valuable insight into the decision making processes within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations along with the heads of foreign policy and defense。 But， VanDeMark shoehorns in a bunch of psychoanalysis， organizational behavioral considerations， and contemporary leadership studies analyses that have no business being in a history book。 This is a sin when it comes to writing pure history as detachment must be established， to the best of the historian's ability， in Road to Disaster contains some valuable insight into the decision making processes within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations along with the heads of foreign policy and defense。 But， VanDeMark shoehorns in a bunch of psychoanalysis， organizational behavioral considerations， and contemporary leadership studies analyses that have no business being in a history book。 This is a sin when it comes to writing pure history as detachment must be established， to the best of the historian's ability， in order to recreate and study events without tainting them with opinions of the present; at least not overtly。 Now， that criticism is based on my biases as a proponent of traditional history。 With that said there are plenty of things to like about this book and no shortage of information to learn about how the presidency and the foreign policy elites' cold war optimism and ambition descended into a toxic escalation in Vietnam which led to the undoing of many brilliant and prominent politicians， policy wonks， military leaders， and presidents。 The book begins with analyses of the cold war crises and early policies of the Kennedy administration before shifting focus to Vietnam。 This works well in establishing a context into how these individuals interacted with each other， warts and all， and confronted substantial challenges。 From there， the transition to Vietnam and the Johnson presidency highlights how confidence from victory in the Second World War and a more traditional， europe-focused establishment confronted the problems in South Vietnam。 It was disastrous。 VanDeMark covers a lot of territory that is too extensive to list here。 It is very thorough， but， again， suffers from the hindsight analysis taken from other disciplines that waters down and at times cheapens the history。 It's also a little odd that VanDeMark starts with Kennedy， but doesn't end with Nixon。 In the closing chapter， he dances around Nixon's policies by describing them as a continuation of what was laid out in McNamara's infamous memo and Johnson's 1968 initiatives。 While there is truth to that， covering the relationship between Nixon and Kissinger and how they made their decisions would have been equally intriguing as that of his predecessors， if not more so。 Plus， with Nixon's insecurities and paranoia， VanDeMark could have had a field with his retrospective diagnosis and quasi-psychological approach to history。 But， I wonder if this was based on the available source material and academic/professional experiences of the author。 The author had ties to McNamara and Clifford before they passed and this access is evident throughout the book。 When you peruse the sources there are plenty of personal interview references。 Incorporating these gives the reader an insider's look into how Kennedy and Johnson interacted with their secretary of state， national security advisors， secretaries of defense， Joint Chiefs of Staff， and MACV leadership。 For me， McNamara had the biggest presence in the book which was fine。 I wonder if VanDeMark will write a biography of McNamara？ He ought to。 Road to Disaster has merits， but not as a detached history of the decisions that led the United States into war。 I would not put this book on a history course syllabus， but students of leadership， organizational behavior， management， and business administration would benefit greatly from VanDeMark's study。 。。。more
Lukas Evan
，
Did I need to read another book about Vietnam？ In 2020？ Probably not。
EA Baker
，
Vietnam has always been a difficult war to understand。 Being one generation removed from the war， since my father was of age but did not serve （he had several friends go and many did not make it back or came home broken）， it was a part of American history that I wanted to know more about。 While Colonel Hackworth's novel About Face and the stories I have read about MACV SOG helped me understand what was happening on the ground and the blunders military leaders made， this book provided an eye-open Vietnam has always been a difficult war to understand。 Being one generation removed from the war， since my father was of age but did not serve （he had several friends go and many did not make it back or came home broken）， it was a part of American history that I wanted to know more about。 While Colonel Hackworth's novel About Face and the stories I have read about MACV SOG helped me understand what was happening on the ground and the blunders military leaders made， this book provided an eye-opening perspective regarding the politicians running the war from the states。 The psychoanalysis of the major players as well as the breakdown of the fallacies LBJ and others found themselves in was sobering， to say the least。 Being turned off by the Ken Burns perspective， coupled with the fact many Vietnam veterans rejected the documentary， I was pleased to find half the answer to the enigma of Vietnam in this novel。 In conjunction with the previously mentioned source materials， this book is a wonderful， detailed dive into the political mess of Vietnam that consumed the United States。 。。。more
Ann
，
A fantastic book。 It approaches the history of the Vietnam quagmire not from a military point of view， not even from a political point of view， but from a decision-making perspective。 Why did intelligent men make stupid decisions？ A whole host of cognitive biases and errors come into play here， from confirmation bias to the fallacy of sunk cost。 The book is of course written with the benefit of hindsight。 I also found it fascinating to see how the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban missile crisis A fantastic book。 It approaches the history of the Vietnam quagmire not from a military point of view， not even from a political point of view， but from a decision-making perspective。 Why did intelligent men make stupid decisions？ A whole host of cognitive biases and errors come into play here， from confirmation bias to the fallacy of sunk cost。 The book is of course written with the benefit of hindsight。 I also found it fascinating to see how the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban missile crisis infused Kennedy and his men with a sense of distrust of military opinion and an overly confident sense of being able to drive the course of events when dealing with the communist adversary， respectively。 When you add to that a total lack of understanding of Vietnamese culture and history， and an inability to distinguish between crushing Nazi troops in WWII vs。 pursuing Vietcong through the jungle， you have the stage set for tragedy。 The author， who worked on the autobiographies of two of major players in the history of the Vietnam war， does an excellent job of highlighting the personalities and relationships in Kennedy and Johnson's entourage。 I found this a fascinating read， and the only reason I don't give it 5 stars is a number of small errors， such as giving the name of the author of "Fire in the Lake" as Francis FitzGerald rather than Frances FitzGerald。 。。。more
John Adams
，
Poor analsisNo discussion of war after Johnson。 What about Nixon etc。 What about the Linebacker operations （all out bombing of the north）。 Brought North to table
John Kaufmann
，
Magisterial。 This is not a battle-by-battle account of the war; it doesn't look at tactical military decisions or the forces on the ground。 Rather， the book focuses on the political and policy considerations of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations that led to escalating US military involvement。 The book starts by laying out the context， in particular the Cold War considerations that influenced Kennedy such as the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis。 It provides background on a few of the Magisterial。 This is not a battle-by-battle account of the war; it doesn't look at tactical military decisions or the forces on the ground。 Rather， the book focuses on the political and policy considerations of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations that led to escalating US military involvement。 The book starts by laying out the context， in particular the Cold War considerations that influenced Kennedy such as the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis。 It provides background on a few of the key actors -- Johnson， Dean Rusk， Robert McNamara， McGeorge Bundy， etc。） -- and the historical influences that shaped their decisionmaking: e。g。， the appeasement of the Munich Agreement， the fate of limited war in Korea， the loss of China。 A unique feature of the book is its application of the various heuristics and biases （highlighted by advances in cognitive ans social psychology over the intervening years） that we humans bring to the choices we make; the author discusses how these blindspots contributed to many of the choices made by Johnson， McNamara， Rusk， et。al。 Great book。 。。。more
Dennis
，
This was a long book and， at times， a bit dry。 However， overall it was a sweeping analysis of America's lost war in Vietnam。 Even though this was a painful read it was also a fascinating read。 If you are interested in history you may want to give this book a try。 This was a long book and， at times， a bit dry。 However， overall it was a sweeping analysis of America's lost war in Vietnam。 Even though this was a painful read it was also a fascinating read。 If you are interested in history you may want to give this book a try。 。。。more
Armand Michael
，
This， along with Fredrik Logevall's books （"Embers of War" and "Choosing War"）， is the best book about the politics of the Vietnam War that I've read。 David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest" is a classic， but I think it's been superseded by these others。 This， along with Fredrik Logevall's books （"Embers of War" and "Choosing War"）， is the best book about the politics of the Vietnam War that I've read。 David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest" is a classic， but I think it's been superseded by these others。 。。。more
Tegan
，
Do not begin this book assuming that this is a history book based on the war in Vietnam。 The author applies the concepts of modern-day psychologists and behavioural scholars to analyze critical fork-in-the-road decisions that led to the war。 By reading this book， readers can not only gain insight into the past， but develop an awareness of the potential lasting impact of their own life choices。 “It is well to remember that making history means understanding that history is sometimes made years af Do not begin this book assuming that this is a history book based on the war in Vietnam。 The author applies the concepts of modern-day psychologists and behavioural scholars to analyze critical fork-in-the-road decisions that led to the war。 By reading this book， readers can not only gain insight into the past， but develop an awareness of the potential lasting impact of their own life choices。 “It is well to remember that making history means understanding that history is sometimes made years after an action itself， and that leaders are ultimately judged not by their day-to-day choices but by the long-term consequences of their decisions。” 。。。more
Philip Kuhn
，
Outstanding work of history and scholarship。 A must read for all those who want to understand how the tragedy of Vietnam happened。 VandeMark clearly spells out the decisions that were made， bu who and why， that lead to so much suffering y other people。 One of the strengths of the book is that the author continually quotes， through out each year he discusses， the number of Americans killed and wounded， as well as the number of Vietnamese killed。 Including civilians。 The reader can't forget theref Outstanding work of history and scholarship。 A must read for all those who want to understand how the tragedy of Vietnam happened。 VandeMark clearly spells out the decisions that were made， bu who and why， that lead to so much suffering y other people。 One of the strengths of the book is that the author continually quotes， through out each year he discusses， the number of Americans killed and wounded， as well as the number of Vietnamese killed。 Including civilians。 The reader can't forget therefore the human costs of the decisions these men made--Johnson， Rusk， McGeorge， Macnamara。 Ans in the epilogue， he covers how each of these four men lived the rest of their lives with the consequences of their decisions。 The best book I have read in 2019。 Phil Kuhn 。。。more
Ryan W。
，
5/5 for VanDeMark's "Road to Disaster。" I've always had a fascination with Vietnam， but more importantly a longing to understand "How did America get something so wrong for so long？" VanDeMark answers that。 I am reminded of the 1980 USA Men's Olympic Hockey team that went on to defeat Russia winning gold。 College players， not even the best in terms of talent， but the right people for the team （I will always subscribe that sports is the best analogy for military and life and this proves no diff 5/5 for VanDeMark's "Road to Disaster。" I've always had a fascination with Vietnam， but more importantly a longing to understand "How did America get something so wrong for so long？" VanDeMark answers that。 I am reminded of the 1980 USA Men's Olympic Hockey team that went on to defeat Russia winning gold。 College players， not even the best in terms of talent， but the right people for the team （I will always subscribe that sports is the best analogy for military and life and this proves no different）。The U。S。 Government had the all-star team at the start of the war。 JFK， Bundy， McNamara， Westmoreland--all of which looking back （hindsight being 20/20） led to a disaster for a multitude of reasons。VanDeMark encompasses such a detailed account from the Bay of Pigs and fall-out between the President and the JCS to the lack of a coherent direction and way forward once involved in a war that many seem to regret in their final years and memoirs。 In the words of Machiavelli， "wars begin when you will， but they do not end when you please。"A must read。 。。。more
Michelle Hopkins
，
If I were to imagine a perfect book or the clearest explanation of the Vietnam War， this is it on both counts。 A monumental achievement filled with exceptional scholarship， research， artistry， and even inspiration （don’t skip the epilogue or hurry over the book’s numerous psychological insights and studies）。 The Vietnam War envelooed my life from grade school to nearly high school graduation。 It comes as welcome relief to finally understand it all and see through an objective lens that life is n If I were to imagine a perfect book or the clearest explanation of the Vietnam War， this is it on both counts。 A monumental achievement filled with exceptional scholarship， research， artistry， and even inspiration （don’t skip the epilogue or hurry over the book’s numerous psychological insights and studies）。 The Vietnam War envelooed my life from grade school to nearly high school graduation。 It comes as welcome relief to finally understand it all and see through an objective lens that life is not in the distance of polarization but in understanding the combination of heroics and tragedy within each of us。 Great book！ 。。。more
Josh
，
VanDeMark has written an engrossing narrative of the decision making culture within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations during America's gradual escalation of commitment to the ongoing civil war in Vietnam during the 1960s。 For those who are extremely well-read in the history of the American War in Vietnam， much of the information here will seem familiar。 However， I would argue that VanDeMark has accomplished something pretty neat here by writing the best single-volume account of these proce VanDeMark has written an engrossing narrative of the decision making culture within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations during America's gradual escalation of commitment to the ongoing civil war in Vietnam during the 1960s。 For those who are extremely well-read in the history of the American War in Vietnam， much of the information here will seem familiar。 However， I would argue that VanDeMark has accomplished something pretty neat here by writing the best single-volume account of these processes in both administrations， while also accounting for how the idiosyncratic psychological foibles of these decision-makers influenced their perspective on America's entry into the war。 VanDeMark suggests that what makes his account unique is his incorporation of cutting-edge research from social psychology to understand what factors influence （and limit） their decision-making calculus， specifically when it comes to high-level decisions that have broad reaching and unforeseeable effects in the future。 I think， at times， this angle was effective even though it often seemed distracting or forced into the narrative。 This book strictly focuses on the decisions behind the gradual escalation of American commitment to the war。 Therefore， there is no discussion of the Nixon administration， Creighton Abram's MACV， or Vietnamese perspectives except insofar as they directly related to various decisions Johnson and his cabinet officials were deliberating at any given moment。 For example， the author includes some discussion toward the end about how Nixon used back-channels to persuade Saigon to boycott peace talks in Paris toward the end of Johnson's tenure as president; a small aside about Abrams' expertise in fighting an insurgency; and the obstinacy of Hanoi officials at every juncture of peace overtures from Washington。 For better reads on those subjects， I would recommend a deeper look into works by Lewis Sorley， Gregory Daddis， and Lien-Hang T。 Nguyen。 VanDeMark also elides any deep discussion of the JCS， but generally echoes the sentiments of H。 R。 McMaster。 I should also add here that VanDeMark is an extremely influential historian of the political and diplomatic histories of this conflict。 He helped Robert McNamara put together his official memoir of the war， In Retrospect， and through his connection with McNamara had unparalleled access to Dean Rusk and Clark Clifford during the 1990s as he spent untold hours interviewing the two men on sundry topics related to the war。 He has also authored previous notable works such as Into the Quagmire。 I would recommend this book for anyone interested in learning more about the American War in Vietnam， specifically for understanding how the United States wound up sending millions of servicemen and women into that theater。 The Audible version， although tipping the scales at 23 hours， is well produced and an enjoyable listen。 。。。more
Gerry Connolly
，
In Road to Disaster Brian VanDeMark dissects the decision steps during the JFK and LBJ presidencies that exponentially widened the US involvement in the Vietnam war。 Using behavioral theories （ e。g。 loss aversion， endowment effect， availability bias） VanDeMark documents the disastrous consequences of constrained thinking， misplaced historical analogies and unquestioned beliefs。 A brilliant analysis of a foreign policy gone awry。 Its consequences still resonate （see Iraq， Afghanistan， the Middle In Road to Disaster Brian VanDeMark dissects the decision steps during the JFK and LBJ presidencies that exponentially widened the US involvement in the Vietnam war。 Using behavioral theories （ e。g。 loss aversion， endowment effect， availability bias） VanDeMark documents the disastrous consequences of constrained thinking， misplaced historical analogies and unquestioned beliefs。 A brilliant analysis of a foreign policy gone awry。 Its consequences still resonate （see Iraq， Afghanistan， the Middle East） 。。。more
Guiltyofbeingmike
，
Filled with implicit biases: for McNamara， against other advisors and President Johnson， and America-centric in reporting the reasons and effects of the war。 None of this diminishes how insightful and thorough this book is。 It’s also filled with psychological reasoning for how many decisions （and errors） were made。 At first， I found this annoying and unnecessary， but eventually it meshed well with the idea of persistently questioning how small， incremental decisions can lead to massive errors in Filled with implicit biases: for McNamara， against other advisors and President Johnson， and America-centric in reporting the reasons and effects of the war。 None of this diminishes how insightful and thorough this book is。 It’s also filled with psychological reasoning for how many decisions （and errors） were made。 At first， I found this annoying and unnecessary， but eventually it meshed well with the idea of persistently questioning how small， incremental decisions can lead to massive errors in judgment。 。。。more
Jim
，
Many books have been written on the tragic decisions regarding Vietnam like any other war that the United States has ever been involved in， however in Road to Disaster Mr。 VanDeMark provides much food for thought from interviews with many of those who were directly involved in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations。 Sometimes it feels like an apologetic view of those directly involved with the process of sending people into the conflict it provides a historical record well worth the read a Many books have been written on the tragic decisions regarding Vietnam like any other war that the United States has ever been involved in， however in Road to Disaster Mr。 VanDeMark provides much food for thought from interviews with many of those who were directly involved in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations。 Sometimes it feels like an apologetic view of those directly involved with the process of sending people into the conflict it provides a historical record well worth the read and review。 As a true war baby from this era， this book provides much background information that enable an understanding not felt before now。 Truly a wonderful work and worth the time investment。 。。。more
Mike
，
Brian Van DeMark helped Robert McNamara write his book "In Retrospect" in 1995。 For this reason I was ready to dismiss "Road to Disaster" as another apologia for McNamara et。 al。 （which is exactly what "In Retrospect" was）。 However， Van DeMark's book is quite the opposite and lays solid blame for the fiasco at the feet of Lyndon Johnson， McNamara and Rusk （among others）。 Because of Van DeMark's extensive interviews with McNamara in 1993 and 1994 （as well as Clark Clifford interviews in 1988） he Brian Van DeMark helped Robert McNamara write his book "In Retrospect" in 1995。 For this reason I was ready to dismiss "Road to Disaster" as another apologia for McNamara et。 al。 （which is exactly what "In Retrospect" was）。 However， Van DeMark's book is quite the opposite and lays solid blame for the fiasco at the feet of Lyndon Johnson， McNamara and Rusk （among others）。 Because of Van DeMark's extensive interviews with McNamara in 1993 and 1994 （as well as Clark Clifford interviews in 1988） he has the record of exactly how the decision making came about regarding the escalation from 1964 through 1967。One unique wrinkle in Van DeMark's book is the prodigious use of psychological theories to describe how some of the decision making might have come about。 Theories described include:Deferred decision makingTheory induced blindnessThe "IKEA" effectIllusion of validityIllusion of explanatory depthFoot in the door effectCreeping normalityLoss aversionSunk cost fallacyPlanning fallacyAct rationalizationSunk costs vs prospective costsAll in all， a good book on a very sore subject。 。。。more
Hotrats
，
Concise and succinct with a nice tie-in of cognitive research to help understand why some decisions were made。
S
，
A good roadmap of the Cold War's tragic middle decade。 Helpfully， the author includes an analysis of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis， two milestones along the way that give a bit more depth to any understanding of the 'what'， 'how'， and 'why' of the Vietnam War。 The narrative is spiced with occasional digressions into cognitive psychological explanations of the principal actors' decision making processes and their outcomes。 A good roadmap of the Cold War's tragic middle decade。 Helpfully， the author includes an analysis of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis， two milestones along the way that give a bit more depth to any understanding of the 'what'， 'how'， and 'why' of the Vietnam War。 The narrative is spiced with occasional digressions into cognitive psychological explanations of the principal actors' decision making processes and their outcomes。 。。。more
Christopher Backa
，
Incomplete study of the war The book does not cover the decisions made during the entire war。 It stops once LBJ leaves office。 The book also covers the early Kennedy administration and the wrong lessons it learned from the bay of Pigs to the Cuban missile crisis。 All of which led to decisions that led to diving into Nam in incorrect assumptions。 The book was interesting and you must have to work around the author’s bias since it feels like he is carrying water for certain players。 You may not wa Incomplete study of the war The book does not cover the decisions made during the entire war。 It stops once LBJ leaves office。 The book also covers the early Kennedy administration and the wrong lessons it learned from the bay of Pigs to the Cuban missile crisis。 All of which led to decisions that led to diving into Nam in incorrect assumptions。 The book was interesting and you must have to work around the author’s bias since it feels like he is carrying water for certain players。 You may not want to throw around adjectives like genius， smart， well intentioned to describe people who couldn’t get past their own egos and felt it better to just pour lives into the grist mill。 。。。more
Justus
，
This ebook version of this does something that I wish all other books would do （especially ebooks）。 It distinguishes between "notes" and "references"。 When you're reading a Kindle and there's that superscript "1" denoting a footnote。。。do you click on it？ If it is a reference， i。e。 "page 47 of Kimble's Our Story， Our Words" then you generally don't。 If it is a note， i。e。 "Bob later fired Smith for this decision but Smith went on to run the FDA for many years successfully"， then you generally do。 This ebook version of this does something that I wish all other books would do （especially ebooks）。 It distinguishes between "notes" and "references"。 When you're reading a Kindle and there's that superscript "1" denoting a footnote。。。do you click on it？ If it is a reference， i。e。 "page 47 of Kimble's Our Story， Our Words" then you generally don't。 If it is a note， i。e。 "Bob later fired Smith for this decision but Smith went on to run the FDA for many years successfully"， then you generally do。 （Or at least I do。） Most ebooks don't distinguish between the two but Road to Disaster does。 This is great！ Why doesn't every book do this？ I can read all the notes I want and skip all the references I don't care about。What's more， Road to Disaster goes one step further and adds numerous notes that simply provide context for those who aren't steeped in the subject matter。 I wish more books did this， instead of assuming every reader knows everything the author knows。 For instance， there's one section introducing Anna Chennault， the widow of Claire Lee Chennault of the Flying Tigers。 Who are the Flying Tigers？ VanDeMark adds a note with a quick explanation of the group and its operations in China during WW2， which helps gives additional subtle explanation to both Chennault's widow being Chinese-born and her strong antipathy towards Communists。Anyway， on to the book itself！ This book is "about Vietnam" but it actually has a very narrow focus on the American decision makers -- and especially on McNamara， Kennedy， and Johnson -- of the Kennedy & Johnson administration。 The book actually ends with the Nixon election of 1968， despite the fact that the war went for 7 more years。 VanDeMark is trying to answer the question of how smart， able men were able to were able to make such catastrophic decisions。 Towards that end he tries to view some of their decisions in light of recent research on behavioural biases。What does the book do well & not so well？The author takes a very sympathetic view towards almost everyone involved， seeing them as fallible humans making difficult decisions with imperfect information。 This isn't to excuse them from their mistakes and personal foibles （he makes a lot of Johnson's personal insecurity， for instance）。 But it is a little refreshing to read a book that acknowledges the complexity of reality。The author also starts the story with the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis and makes a credible case for their impact on the decisions about Vietnam。 Primarily that "steadily increasing force will cause the other side to negotiate" seemed to work。The focus -- not just yet another general history of Vietnam -- was refreshing。 On a topic that has been done to death， a bit of novelty is good。The book also had two underexplored areas that I still thought were fascinating。The first is that the implication that the slow slide into Vietnam was in some way a necessary price to pay for the Great Society legislation。 That Vietnam would distract from Johnson's great legislative efforts was a constant fear of his in the early days， which seemed to bear weight when later on that's exactly what happened。 If Johnson had given up in Vietnam early on， would that have caused the hawks in the Democratic party to abandon him。 Would we never had had the Voting Rights Act of 1965？ Likewise， if Johnson had been truthful and upfront with Americans about the growing scope of the war， would that spotlight have derailed the passage of Medicare in America？A related topic is that impact of war hawks on Johnson， the war efforts， and politics in general。 I think the common perception nowadays is that it was Johnson vs。 War Protestors and that Johnson sorta tricked the country into sliding into Vietnam。 But in Road to Disaster it is clear that's not really the story。 Most of the time， most of the country wanted MORE involvement in Vietnam。 They wanted bigger troop build ups， they wanted more bombing。 In the election of 1968 it was the war hawks who dominated。What kinds of thing might people take issue with？This is clearly a very sympathetic view of McNamara in particular。 McNamara tends to be viewed unfavorably by both sides （hawks & doves both hate him） and can be a lightning rod。The Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular come across as somewhere between incompetent and insane。 Many who are ardently pro-military may take umbrage with that portrayal， though the author tends to have much more favorable views of military leaders on the ground， so he's not anti-military per se。The attempted use of modern behavioural biases is kinda interesting but not really satisfying。 It has the benefit of explicitly calling out when McNamara or whoever was engaging in confirmation bias or sunk cost fallacies。 But I'm also not convinced this is a major step forward。 I feel like those concepts are so widespread that even if a book doesn't explicitly call them out， many readers would go "oh， Johnson is engaging in the sunk cost fallacy here by talking about the 11，000 Americans who died already！"Finally， since the book is attempt to explain how such terrible decisions could have been made， VanDeMark is surprisingly light on ways we can avoid similar mistakes in the future。 To some extent， that is a testament to the enduring power of behavioural biases。 But for a book that was so much "how could they have made such bad decisions" I kinda expect more on "。。。and here's how we can avoid that in the future"。 。。。more
Harry Rothmann
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Histories of the Vietnam War are abundant。 As these proliferate， as is now the case with over fifty years past America's initial combat unit involvement in 1965， historians begin to gather and lump similar views into groups。 For the Vietnam War these groups have evolved into two main genres - the orthodox and revisionist views。 The orthodox - represented by such works as David Halberstam's "Best and Brightest，" Neil Sheehan's "A Bright and Shining Star，" Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam: A History，" an Histories of the Vietnam War are abundant。 As these proliferate， as is now the case with over fifty years past America's initial combat unit involvement in 1965， historians begin to gather and lump similar views into groups。 For the Vietnam War these groups have evolved into two main genres - the orthodox and revisionist views。 The orthodox - represented by such works as David Halberstam's "Best and Brightest，" Neil Sheehan's "A Bright and Shining Star，" Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam: A History，" and George Herring's "America's Longest War" - generally portrays the war as an immoral conflict fought with no primary US national interest at stake。 In so doing， the US supported a hopelessly corrupt and illegally formed South Vietnam State， and opposed a foe who rightfully represented the nationalistic aspirations of the Vietnamese people。 Moreover， the war， because of the above， was unwinnable and resulted in the needless loss of over 58，000 American and millions of Vietnamese lives。On the other hand， the revisionist view sees the war as， what former President Ronald Reagan called， "a noble cause。" It was intended rightfully to stop the flow of communism in Asia， as the US had successfully done in Europe。 The US failed to do that because American civilian leaders did not provide the means and ways that its military needed to accomplish its mission。 Professor Brian VanDeMark writes what he calls "A New History" of the war， indicating perhaps that this latest rendition is different from those that had come before， i。e。， neither orthodox or revisionist。 But is this so？ And how is it different？Certainly， for this reviewer at least， a book by this author on the Vietnam War could be newsworthy。 Professor VanDeMark after all assisted Robert McNamara in the Secretary's writing of his memoirs - the now infamous "In Retrospect。" And in this regard his book could be something new and perhaps revealing if he would provide some additional insights on McNamara's role in the war。 Here the author does not entirely disappoint， at least in the number of times he provides new quotes from McNamara on his role in the war revealed to him as he assisted in the writing of the Secretary’s memoirs。 Unfortunately， many of these ‘new’ revelations from McNamara are not really new because they repeat the same “In Retrospect” apologies。 The only new points of view offered are the depth of the architect of the Vietnam War’s remorse for his mistakes， and the author’s sympathies for them。 Despite this ‘nothing really new’ portion of the book， Professor VAnDeMark does offer a new approach throughout his work in his description and analyses of the US decision making interactions and processes during the war。 Here he successfully uses the works of several social psychologists to explain “How and why did such intelligent and patriotic men not only make such unwise decisions but continue to make them despite circumstances and their previous professional accomplishments。” All of this is done quite convincingly in examining and providing useful insights into the pitfalls of assumption making， the influence of previous experiences and education， and the dangers of human arrogance and shortsightedness。 Beyond these pitfalls， Professor VanDeMark's greatest contribution in this work to the overall history of the war is to avoid the judgments and second-guessing of both the orthodox and revisionist viewpoints and focus on what is relevant as a lesson of the war - how to create more effective decision-making in wartime。 Here he concludes， “Dealing with immensely complex problems like Vietnam demands a disciplined routine in which decision-makers acknowledge their fallibility， talk frankly with one another—most especially， share their apprehensions （which Johnson， McNamara， and the chiefs never really did）—and adopt methodical teamwork to catch problems and increase the probability that they have the critical information they need when they need it in order to craft solutions to the problems facing them”All in all then this work is a refreshing look at what matters in looking at the American experience in the Vietnam War - how and why did US leaders make such terrible decisions that led to disaster and defeat， and how can we learn from their mistakes。 。。。more
Matt
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“The American war in Vietnam ground on for eight long years， from 1965 to 1973。 It notoriously and voraciously consumed both lives and reputations on its way to becoming an iconic cautionary tale: hubris – arrogance and price that ancient Greeks warned against twenty-five hundred years ago – led the United States at the height of its power into the quagmire of Vietnam。 The resulting war grew into a disastrous and divisive conflict that devastated the land of Indochina， killed an estimated 3 mill “The American war in Vietnam ground on for eight long years， from 1965 to 1973。 It notoriously and voraciously consumed both lives and reputations on its way to becoming an iconic cautionary tale: hubris – arrogance and price that ancient Greeks warned against twenty-five hundred years ago – led the United States at the height of its power into the quagmire of Vietnam。 The resulting war grew into a disastrous and divisive conflict that devastated the land of Indochina， killed an estimated 3 million Vietnamese and more than 58，000 Americans， exposed the limits of America’s massive military power， sapped American treasure， polarized American politics， shook Americans’ faith in their country and themselves， and cast a shadow that persists to this day…”-tBrian VanDeMark， Road to DisasterOn February 19， 1966， UPI White House correspondent Merriman Smith wrote a letter to President Lyndon Johnson。 “Please accept my gratitude，” the letter began， “for your most considerate note of last evening concerning the loss of my boy in Vietnam。 While it is hard to explain to his younger brother and sister， and at this point， beyond rationalization for his young wife and her two babies， we all know and accept with some degree of comfort the purpose of his mission。” Smith went on to explain that while his son， an Army captain， had not been especially eager to enter the war in Vietnam， he did so with professionalism and a belief that he was helping others。 That his mission， ultimately， was to bring freedom to the Vietnamese。 “My boy did not die for an empty cause，” Smith concluded。 “His hope was yours…peace and at least a chance at a better life for others。” President Johnson said the letter brought him to tears。 Four years later， never recovered from his son’s death， Smith shot himself in the head。 This is the Vietnam War in a nutshell。 A tragic conflict in which the secondary effects are nearly as powerful as the direct。 A war that killed millions， wounded even more， devastated one country physically and fractured another country politically and socially。 All for a purpose that always seemed a bit more theoretical than practical。 Because of that， entire libraries have been built to house the books attempting to explain America’s doomed entry into a Southeast Asian civil war。 Brian VanDeMark’s Road to War is a brilliant and lucid addition to this canon， leading the reader through a figurative jungle of flawed decision-making with perception， insight， and a great deal of empathy。 From start to finish， it is a gripping account。 Surprisingly， VanDeMark does not start this tale with Truman， Eisenhower， or the French。 Instead， he begins with John F。 Kennedy， the Bay of Pigs， and the Cuban Missile Crisis。 He uses approximately the first hundred pages to discuss how Kennedy’s “best and brightest” drew the wrong lessons from their Cuban adventures （especially regarding the effectiveness of calibration of force）， constructing a framework that led inexorably towards escalation。 Road to Disaster ends in 1968， with President Johnson’s failed attempt to reach a peace agreement with North Vietnam。 VanDeMark is perfectly suited for this material。 He has a PhD and teaches history at the United States Naval Academy。 He is not simply a dedicated researcher， but he has helped create many primary sources himself， by working on the memoirs of two Secretaries of Defense: Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford。 His firsthand experiences with these men goes a long way to this humanistic portrait of essentially decent men making fundamentally bad choices。 （Of course， as with every other aspect of the Vietnam experience， the good faith/bad faith of the participants remains an open question。 It is possible that a more cynical person will find VanDeMark’s near-Jesuitical approach to be naïve or even disingenuous。 Certainly， his firsthand experience with many of the players has convinced him that they were not hiding goat’s horns and dark ulterior motives， but rather， that they did their best in the belief they were doing the right thing）。 Vietnam is a subject that I am just now starting to study。 It is a dauntingly complex topic， and it can be hard to know where to begin。 Recently， I finished Max Hastings’ instant-classic， Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy， which gave me a really solid foundation upon which to build。 Road to Disaster is so well constructed， however， that I am confident I would not have gotten lost even if this was the first Vietnam book I ever picked up。 VanDeMark is a talented writer and does a fine job with structuring and organizing his material。 Road to Disaster does have some limitations。 By skipping over Eisenhower， you lose quite a bit of context about America’s slide into war。 There is also a very tight focus on American decision makers， without a lot of discussion on South Vietnamese or North Vietnamese leadership。 （Though VanDeMark does mark the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem as the point where things really started to go wrong）。 The military aspects of Vietnam are told in only the broadest strokes （so even though prior knowledge about the Vietnam War is not a necessary predicate to tackling this， it is helpful）。 For me， the most fascinating aspect of Road to Disaster is VanDeMark’s use of cognitive science and psychology to dissect why certain decisions were made and policies implemented。 This is not a psychobiography by any means， but he often uses neuropsychology as guide to how some extremely smart people did some extremely dumb things。 To that end， there are discussions （including references to famous experiments） about confirmation bias， recency bias， the illusion of validity， the illusion of explanatory depth， creeping normality， belief perseverance， and a textbook’s worth of other tendencies。 I imagine that this method will be controversial。 Typically， historians avoid psychoanalyzing historical figures as they would a rabid squirrel。 And to be sure， there is the potential for glibness in these diagnoses。 Yet in doing so， VanDeMark reminds us that we are dealing with humans。 More than that， we are dealing with humans under duress， under strain， under impossible pressures。 We cannot understand an event like Vietnam with the cold logic of hindsight， because it distorts the record。 It leads to incorrect conclusions and allegations of perfidy。 Instead， there has to be an acknowledgement of the myriad factors that led incredibly smart and talented people such as Robert McNamara to err so badly。 （The side benefit is that I gained a lot of insight about how I make decisions as well。 This will be helpful if I am ever suddenly elevated to a cabinet-level position）。 Sometimes， you can employ an excellent process in making decisions， utilizing logic， statistics， and clear-eyed thinking， and still get bad results， simply because that is the nature of life and luck。 Sometimes， you can have a terrible process in making decisions， utilizing prejudices， gut feelings， and omens， and still get excellent results， just because fortune smiled upon you。 As VanDeMark shows in Road to Disaster， U。S。 policymakers found themselves in the worst of all possible worlds: their decision-making process was deeply flawed， and they never caught a lucky break that might have saved them。 。。。more
Linnaea
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The problem with sharing a library account is people think that 1 week is enough time to check out a library book， they are wrong。 I waited weeks to finish the last part of this book and it was worth it。 VanDeMark uses cognitive science and personal experience （he helped write McNamara's autobiography） to explore what lead to the decisions for each step into Vietnam。 The book starts before the beginnings of the war with the Bay of Pigs， VanDeMark uses that along with the Cuban Missile Crisis to The problem with sharing a library account is people think that 1 week is enough time to check out a library book， they are wrong。 I waited weeks to finish the last part of this book and it was worth it。 VanDeMark uses cognitive science and personal experience （he helped write McNamara's autobiography） to explore what lead to the decisions for each step into Vietnam。 The book starts before the beginnings of the war with the Bay of Pigs， VanDeMark uses that along with the Cuban Missile Crisis to lay a groundwork of misunderstandings and miscommunications between the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations and the military。 At times the cognitive science examples and explanations took away from the narrative but it was still interesting。 。。。more
Doug
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Long （over 500 pages） and detailed look behind the scenes of decisions made before and during the Viet Nam war。
Michael Kelley
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